RESEARCH

Un tal Ernestico/a certain Ernestico: On the structure of proper names

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Proper names are usually assumed to be definite. In this paper we question this assumption by analyzing the Spanish construction *un tal 'X'* 'a certain 'X''. We show that '*un tal 'X''* has two meanings, one evidential and one evaluative, and with the evidential meaning the determiner must be indefinite. In those conditions, 'X' is always a proper name. We argue that proper names usually involve a presuppositional, familiar referent, expressed through the definite determiner. However, evidentiality conflicts with familiarity, hence the definite is no longer possible. Finally, we argue that proper names are licensed by features from a hierarchy that applies either to the referential base, yielding person licensing, or to an evidential base, producing sequences such as *un tal 'X'*.

Keywords: proper names; definiteness; familiarity; determiner; evidentiality

1 Background

Proper names (PNs) raise important questions from syntactic and semantic/philosophical perspectives. Semantically, the meaning of PNs has been argued to refer directly to individuals (cf. Kripke 1980, among many others). For other researchers, PNs are associated with a naming predicate (cf. Burge 1973; Geurts 1997a; b; Matushansky 2008; Fara 2015 among others; see summaries in Gray 2012; Jeshion 2015). PNs also raise issues regarding their syntactic structure and distribution, plausibly related to their semantic interpretation. Is their structure comparable to that of common-noun DPs? Whenever they appear with a determiner, what is their status, and how are they interpreted (cf. Longobardi 1994; 2005; 2008, among others)? On the one hand, Longobardi suggests that DPs in general, including PNs, require a determiner position to be arguments, and this requirement forces the N to move to D, or an overt, expletive determiner to be inserted in D. On the other hand, Borer (2005), Matushansky (2008) and Ghomeshi & Massam (2009) mark the PN determiner as definite, and make this follow from the uniqueness meaning of PNs.

This paper aims to contribute to these debates by analyzing the sequence *un tal 'X'*, 'a so-called 'X'' in Spanish. In this sequence, X is typically a PN but the determiner tends to be indefinite, contrary to what the usual analyses of PN determiners would predict. *Tal*, in turn, contributes an evidential meaning. I will suggest that both properties are related: whenever *tal* has evidential content, it appears with a PN because PNs involve a naming function 'the 'X' called 'Y'', along the lines of Burge (1973). Thus, *un tal 'X'* roughly means 'the person allegedly called 'X''. The fact that the determiner cannot be definite also follows from evidentiality: familiarity, one of the defining properties of definiteness, clashes with evidential content, and this clash results in having an indefinite determiner. The paper is organized as follows: in the rest of the introduction, I review

the two traditional semantic analyses of PNs (section 1.1) and syntactic views on PNs (section 1.2). Section 2 presents the general distribution of *un tal 'X'* (section 2.1), its evidential/evaluative content (section 2.2) and the interaction between evidentiality and definiteness (section 2.3). Section 3 introduces the analysis; in section 3.1, I present the assumptions regarding definiteness; in section 3.2, the proposal regarding evidentiality and the naming function for PNs; in section 3.3, I derive the incompatibility between *tal* and the definite article; in section 3.4, I address the issue of what feature licenses a PN, looking at the connection between person-licensing of PNs and evidentiality-licensing of PNs, based on Speas' (2004) proposal. Section 4 presents the conclusions of the article.

1.1 Two semantic views of PNs

At first sight, PNs seem to refer to objects: the name *Susan* simply points to a referent and does not provide a description of that referent (cf. Mill 1843/1973; Kaplan 1989; Jeshion 2015; Saab & Lo Guercio 2018, among others). This reference remains constant across possible worlds, and for this reason, PNs are singular, rigid designators that do not interact with quantified items (cf. Kripke 1980: 1971). In this sense, they contrast with common nouns (CNs). However, PNs in examples like (1)a–b, from Burge (1973), and (2), quoted by Matushansky (2008: 598), do not seem to be rigid designators: they appear with overt quantifiers and look more like common nouns (CNs).

(1)   a.   There are relatively few Alfreds in Princeton.

        b.   Some Alfreds are crazy; some are sane.

(2)   E. Brontë, *Wuthering Heights*:
        …but no Catherine could I detect, far or near.

For this reason, other researchers have suggested that PNs are predicates involving naming: *Ernestico* means 'the 'X' named 'Ernestico'' (cf. Kneale 1962; Burge 1973; Geurts 1997a; b; Matushansky 2008; Gray 2012, among others). In Burge's (1973: 428) words: "a proper name is a predicate true of an object if and only if the object is given that name in an appropriate way." Although these approaches share the notion of a naming predicate, they differ in important ways, such as whether PNs are rigid designators or not.[1]

   Proponents of the referential analysis of PNs note that PNs can be used in contexts where the predicative analysis is not so straightforward (cf. Jeshion 2015). Andrés Saab (p.c.) notes examples such as (3), from Saab & Lo Guercio (2018).

(3)   a.   Vi   un Rembrandt en el   museo.
               saw a   Rembrandt in the museum
               'I saw a Rembrandt in the museum.'

        b.   Los Messi son muy unidos.
               the Messi are very united
               'The Messi (family) are very united.'

        c.   Me compré una Fender.
               CL bought a   Fender
               'I bought a Fender.'

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[1] The debate on whether PNs are referential or predicative is longstanding, particularly in the semantic litera-
    ture. This paper does not directly address the philosophical arguments in that debate, but rather addresses
    the potential consequences of the distribution of *un tal 'X'* 'a certain x' for those views.

These examples involve deferred interpretations (Jeshion 2015), in the sense that the literal referent of the PN (the painter *Rembrandt* in (3)a) is connected to the object by some meaning extension ('the painting by Rembrandt'). Crucially, however, these examples do not involve a direct naming function, so that (3)a in the deferred interpretation does not mean 'I saw the object named Rembrandt in the museum'. We will return to these examples below.

1.2 Syntactic views on PNs

PNs also raise important syntactic questions. First, they tend to be bare singulars in languages that do not generally allow bare singulars, as illustrated in (4)a vs. (4)b–c. Whereas *Ana* can be bare in the first example, *hermana* 'sister' cannot appear without a determiner in the second one.

(4)   a.   Ana llegó.
              Ana arrived
              'Ana arrived.'

        b. *Hermana llegó.
              sister   arrived

        c.   La/nuestra hermana llegó.
              the/our   sister   arrived
              'Our sister arrived.'

Longobardi (1994) has suggested that this is an illusory contrast: both (4)a and (4)c involve a DP, but (4)a has obligatory N-to-D raising, whereas (4)c has an overt determiner. N-to-D raising results from an independent requirement that arguments be DPs headed by an overtly realized D head. This head may be overt or it may be realized as the raised PN. Longobardi mentions languages with overt PN determiners as evidence for his analysis. For example, in Greek and in Chilean Spanish, the definite determiner appears with PNs, as seen in (5). In this case, the determiner is expletive, in the sense that it is only required to fill the D position, but it does not contribute additional meaning.

(5)   *Greek* (Ghomeshi & Massam 2009)
        Aftos ine o   Vasilis.
        this   is   the Basil
        'This is Basil.'

The notion that D is an expletive would explain languages where it is optionally present, or restricted to a certain gender. For example, in Castilian Spanish, *el* 'the.MAS' tends to be optional, but *la* 'the.FEM' tends to be more frequently overt, as seen in (6). In addition to Castilian Spanish, oral registers of Latin American Spanish, as well as the regional Italian spoken in Trentino (Jan Casalicchio, p.c.) and several other Gallo-Romance varieties have this pattern, as noted by an anonymous reviewer.

(6)   Restricted/optional overt PN determiner. *Castilian Spanish*
        a.   (El)   Julio vino ayer.
              the.MAS Julio came yesterday
              'Julio came yesterday.'

        b.   La   Julia comió aquí.
              the.FEM Julia ate   here
              'Julia ate here.'

A third set of languages have specialized determiners for PNs as seen in (7)–(8). In (7), the genitive marker is different for *buhay* 'life' (genitive: *ng*) than for *Maria* (specialized genitive *ni*) in Tagalog.

(7)   Specialized overt PN determiner. *Tagalog* (Himmelmann 2008)
        Tingn-an   mo   ang   gandá   na   ng   buhay   ni   Maria.
        look-LOC.VOICE   2.SG.POSS   SPEC   beauty   now   GEN   life   GEN.PN   Mary
        'Look how beautiful Maria's life is now (lit. look at the beauty of Maria's life now).'

In Balearic Catalan, the PN determiner is *en/na* 'D.MAS/D.FEM' as illustrated in (8)a–b, from Bernstein, Ordóñez & Roca (2016). The CN definite determiner in this variety is *es/sa*.

(8)   *Balearic Catalan*
        a.   en   Joan, n'Andreu
             D.MAS Joan, D.MAS Andreu

        b.   na   Maria, n'Anna
             D.FEM Maria   D.FEM Anna

Languages that have a determiner with PNs tend to use the definite one if they do not use a specialized one (cf. Chierchia 1998: 397; Matushansky 2008: 593). Chierchia specifically states: "if a language assigns a proper name to the semantic category pred, its only option for turning the proper name into an argument will be to project the category D. Furthermore, the only choice of determiner is *the*." This generalization is stated in (9) and illustrated with the Spanish examples in (10) and the Greek examples in (11). The alternative to drafting the definite determiner for PNs is to have a specialized PN determiner, as we above saw for Catalan and Tagalog.

(9)   If a PN determiner is one of the regular determiners in the language, it tends to be the definite one.

(10)   *Chilean and other Spanish varieties*
        a.   l-a   Marta
             the-FEM Marta
             'Marta'

        b.   l-a   cas-a
             the-FEM house-FEM
             'the house'

(11)   *Greek*
        a.   i   Eleni
             the.FEM Eleni
             'Eleni'

        b.   i   gynaika
             the.FEM woman
             'the woman'

To the extent that (9) holds, it is generally related to the meaning of PNs or the meaning of DPs containing PNs. Thus, for Ghomeshi & Massam (2009), DPs with a PN are headed by $D_{DEF, PROPER}$. Consequently, in Chilean Spanish, the morphological exponents of this determiner would be *el* or *la* depending on gender.

  Similar explanations for (9) follow from the properties of PNs in Borer's (2005) and Matushansky's (2006) analyses, although they rely on very different overall assumptions.

For Borer, insertion of a PN determiner follows from a <def-u> feature in D, which is definite (in addition to having a specific kind of content associated with PN interpretation). In Matushansky's proposal, the type of determiner depends on language-specific morphological spellout rules, but the determiner is specified as D_{DEF}.

The generalization in (9), and the principles that derive it suggest a connection between the nature of PNs and definiteness. On the other hand, Longobardi (1994; 2005; 2008) analyzes PN determiners as expletive, in the sense that they do not seem to contribute any semantic content that is not already present in the PN.[2] Thus, the optionally of determiners in varieties such as the one illustrated in (6) above does not seem to correlate with obvious semantic differences. As a result, we seem to have the paradox illustrated in (12).

(12) a. D_{PN} are definite

   b. D_{PN} are expetive

The analyses proposed by Borer, by Ghomeshi & Massam and by Matushansky build definiteness into the PN determiner, explaining why it often overlaps with the regular definite determiner, and account for its apparent optionality through morphological rules, whereas Longobardi removes any content from D_{PN}, and justifies its presence for independent reasons, namely for the requirement that arguments must be DPs.

A third related issue addresses the licensing of PNs and DPs in general. In Longobardi's (2008) and Bernstein's (2008) analyses, N raises to D attracted by a [person] feature. Chierchia (1998) and more recently Longobardi (2008) point out that nouns must appear with an overt determiner in Italian, but pronouns void this requirement, as seen in (13). (13)a presents a sentence with a regular D (*i*, 'the'), and (13)b shows one with the pronoun *noi* 'we'. As (13)c shows, it is not possible to have both at the same time. This leads him to conclude that "the category D minimally consists of the person feature" (Longobardi 2008: 200).

(13) a. I   ricchi stanno trascurando certi   problema.
          the   rich   are.3PL neglecting   certain problems
          'The rich are neglecting certain problems.'

   b. Noi ricchi stiamo trascurando certi   problema.
          we rich   are.1PL neglecting   certain problems
          'We the rich are neglecting certain problems.'

   c. *I   ricchi noi stiamo trascurando certi   problema
          the rich   we are.1PL neglecting   certain problems

In sum, the three questions in the literature that frame this paper are the following: first, is there a naming function as part of the meaning of PNs? Second, is the definite determiner the result of the PN's meaning? Third, what feature licenses PNs?

2 A certain determiner

Spanish has a determiner-like phrase *un tal* that can be translated as 'a certain/one X', 'a so-called X'.[3] In this section, I will review its general distribution, as well as its evaluative meaning and definiteness constraints.

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[2] As far as I can tell, Longobardi (2005) does not provide a principled account for (9), because overt PN determiners are expletive in his analysis, so in principle, one could get a non-definite determiner (as in Tagalog or Catalan).

[3] As I will describe below, *tal* can be evidential or evaluative. Throughout the paper, the evaluative meaning of *tal* will be glossed as 'so-called', and translated using scare quotes in the examples. This convention will only be used when speaking about the evaluative meaning specifically, otherwise, the gloss will be 'certain', which tends to reflect the evidential meaning.

2.1 General properties

The determiner-like phrase *un tal* is specialized for PNs, as illustrated in the following examples (from the Spanish corpus CREA, cf. Real Academia Española):

(14) a. *Granma Internacional*, 26/09/2000, Cuba. CREA, accessed on 11/17/17
      Según   Yunior, fue **un tal**   Ernestico, de   Placetas, quien le
      according Yunior, was a   certain Ernestico, from Placetas, who   CL
      entregó el dinero para comprar el barco.
      gave   the money to   buy   the boat
      'According to Yunior, it was **a certain** Ernestico, from Placetas, who gave him the money to buy the boat.'

   b. *El Mundo – Su Ordenador (Suplemento)*, 18/05/1997. CREA, accessed on 11/17/17
      … con   mensajes como 'Clemente es un eunuco', (de **un tal**
         with messages with 'Clemente is a eunuch', (of a   certain
      'Venganza Polish')
      'Revenge   Polish').
      '…with messages such as 'Clemente is a eunuch' (from **a certain** 'Polish Revenge').'

Un tal 'a certain' has the following properties: 1) it only appears with PNs, 2) the PN is animate/human, 3) *un tal 'X'* is singular, 4) a prenominal adjective is not possible, 5) *un tal 'X'* does not have the properties of an indefinite, 6) it is not interpreted as definite and 7) *tal* conveys an evidential ('alleged') or evaluative, distancing meaning.[4]

The first property is illustrated in (15), where CNs are ungrammatical:

(15) *Un tal   encuestador/policía/vendedor de seguros   llamó por teléfono.
      a   certain pollster/police officer/seller   of insurance called by phone
      'A certain pollster/police officer/insurance salesman phoned.'

A corpus search of CREA for the sequence *un tal* yielded 934 cases. Of the first 300 consulted, all of the ones with the relevant meaning had a PN except for the one in (16). This example includes a nominalized relative clause in place of the PN, but it is interpreted as if it were a PN, as in the English phrase *what's-his/her-name*.

(16) Speech by Fidel Castro at the closing of the VIII Congress of Cuba.
      CREA, accessed on 11/17/17
      Este anunciaba una nueva biografía del   Papa Juan Pablo Segundo, por
      this announced a   new   biography of-the Pope John Paul Second   by
      un tal   no sé   quién, autor yanqui.
      a   certain not know.1SG who   author Yankee
      'This one announced a new biography of Pope Juan Pablo the Second, by a certain what's-his-name, a Yankee author.'

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[4] Balearic Catalan PN articles share several of the properties listed here. They differ with respect to evidentiality: in Balearic, the referent of the PN must be familiar to the speaker, as an anonymous reviewer notes, cf. Bernstein et al. (2016).

Brazilian Portuguese also has a similar construction, *un tal de João* 'a certain Joao', brought to my attention by Andrew Nevins (p.c.). However, the conditions and the distribution of the Brazilian Portuguese construction are different, for example, the preposition (impossible in Spanish) is optional in Brazilian Portuguese. Thanks also to Marcello Modesto for discussion on Brazilian Portuguese facts.

Un tal cannot appear in the deferred interpretation contexts presented in (3), as seen in (17). The first example can only have the literal PN interpretation 'an 'X' allegedly called 'Y''. The other two are ungrammatical because they do not fulfil some of the other properties: (17)b applies to a plural and (17)c applies to an inanimate object.

(17)   a. #Vi   un tal Rembrandt en el   museo.
           saw a   tal Rembrandt in the museum
           'I saw a certain Rembrandt in the museum.'

       b. *Unos tales   Messi son muy unidos.
           some certain Messi are very united
           'The Messi (family) are very united.'

       c. *Me compré una tal   Fender.
           CL bought a   certain Fender
           'I bought a cerain Fender.'

We can draw the conclusion from this paradigm that deferred interpretation cases do not involve literal uses of PNs (cf. Fara 2015).

   The second property states that only human/animate PNs can appear with *un tal*, as illustrated in (18): river names, cities and towns do not appear with *un tal* 'a certain', regardless of the syntactic structure of the name of the locality. In (18)b, for example, *Tunja* is a bare NP, whereas *La Unión* is a DP with a definite determiner in (18)c, and *Aguascalientes* is a plural NP in (18)d. By contrast, a PN like Chu-Lín that refers to a famous zoo panda, is acceptable, as seen in (19).

(18)   a. *Nos encontramos un tal   río   Ulcumayo.
           CL found   a   certain river Ulcumayo

       b. ??Visitamos una tal   Tunja.
           visited   a   certain Tunja
           'We visited a certain Tunja.'

       c. ??Visitamos una tal   La Unión.
           visited   a   certain La Unión

       d. *Visitamos una tal   Aguascalientes.
           visited   a   certain Aguascalientes

(19)   Se murió un tal   Chu-Lín.
       CL died   a   certain Chu-Lin
       'A certain Chu-Lin [a panda bear] died.'

All of the grammatical examples presented so far illustrate that *un tal* appears with a singular PN, the third property. The example in (20)a shows that a plural PN is ungrammatical with *unos tales*, unlike the counterpart without *tal* shown in (20)b.

(20)   a. *Llega-ron   un-o-s   tal-es   Luca-s.
           arrive-3.PAST.PL a-MAS-PL certain-PL Luca-PL

       b. Llega-ron   un-o-s   Luca-s.
           arrive-3.PAST.PL a-MAS-PL Luca-PL
           'Some (people named) Lucas arrived.'

The fourth property states that prenominal adjectives are disallowed with *un tal 'X'*. For example, *simpático* 'charming' or *supuesto* 'alleged' cannot appear prenominally, as

seen in (21). This property is shared with bare PNs, which cannot be preceded by an adjective either, as seen in (22) (cf. Longobardi 1994).

(21)   *Fue   un tal   simpático/supuesto Ernestico.
         was a   certain charming/alleged   Ernestico

(22)   *Antigua Roma era   una ciudad muy hermosa.
          ancient   Rome was a   city   very beautiful

The last three properties we have just seen strongly suggest that *un tal 'X'* behaves like a regular PN: PNs are singular when they have rigid scope, they are typically animate, with certain exceptions like geographical place names, and they do not allow prenominal adjectives.

   Property five states that *un tal 'X'* does not have the typical properties of indefinites. In order to illustrate this, I note that PNs can sometimes be interpreted as CNs, and in such contexts, they interact with quantifiers. For example, Geurts (1997b: 323) points out that in (23), the modal takes scope over *Leslie*, so that this sentence can be paraphrased as 'it may be the case that a person named 'Leslie' is a man or a woman'. In this particular context, *Leslie* loses the scope rigidity usually associated with PNs, although as an anonymous reviewer points out, this use may refer to the name *Leslie* itself, rather than to anyone named Leslie.

(23)   In English, Leslie may be a man or a woman.

Un tal 'X' does not behave in the same way in similar contexts, even though it has an overtly indefinite determiner. For example, the modal cannot take scope over *un tal Adrián* in (24), which is not interpreted as a semantic indefinite.

(24)   *Un tal   Adrián puede ser un nombre inglés,   español o   catalán.
          a   certain Adrian can   be   a   name   English, Spanish or Catalan

This sentence is ungrammatical presumably because *un tal 'X'* refers to an actual person named *Adrián*, and not to any person who may bear that name.

   Similarly, note that it is not possible to add *u otro* 'or another', or *cualquiera* 'whatsoever' to *un tal 'X'*, as seen in (25)a–(26)a, whereas the counterparts of those examples without *tal* are possible (cf. (25)b–(26)b). These facts taken together strongly suggest that despite having an overt indefinite determiner, *un tal 'X'* is not interpreted as an indefinite DP.

(25)   a. *Llegó   un tal   Ernestico u otro.
               arrived a   certain Ernestico or another

        b. Llegó   un Ernestico u otro.
             arrived a   Ernestico or another
             'Some Ernestico or another arrived.'

(26)   a. *Un tal   Ernestico cualquiera va   a arrastrar-te a la   miseria.
               a   certain Ernestico whatsoever goes to drag-CL   to the misery

        b. Un Ernestico cualquiera va   a arrastrar-te a la   miseria.
             a   Ernestico whatsoever goes to drag-CL   to the misery
             'Any Ernestico will cause your misery.'

The sixth property is somewhat surprising as well: despite designating a single, unique individual, *un tal 'X'* can appear in existential constructions (cf. (27)a), unlike bare PNs, seen in (27)b. PNs with just an indefinite article pattern in the same way as *un tal 'X'* (cf. (27)c).

(27)   a.   Había un tal   Ernestico en la   sala.
               was   a   certain Ernestico in the room
               'There was a certain Ernestico in the room.'

         b.   *Había Ernestico en la   sala.
               was   Ernestico in the room

         c.   Había un Ernestico en la   sala.
               was   a   Ernestico in the room
               'There was an Ernestico in the room.'

Similarly, *un tal* patterns with bare *un* in the context of small clauses with a verb of naming, seen in (28) (cf. Matushansky 2008). In those environments, *un tal 'X'* becomes ungrammatical, as seen in (29)a, just like a regular indefinite article (cf. (29)b).[5]

(28)   Bautizaron a la   niña Paula.
         baptized   to the girl Paula
         'They baptized the girl 'Paula.'

(29)   a.   *Bautizaron a la   niña una tal   Paula.
              baptized   to the girl a   certain Paula

         b.   *Bautizaron a la   niña una Paula.
              baptized   to the girl a   Paula

In sum, *un tal 'X'* shares a similar distribution to bare PNs, in particular it shows no scope interactions (unlike indefinite PNs), but it is not interpreted as a bare PN in existential contexts. In several other contexts, however, it patterns the same way as a bare indefinite *un X*. In the following section, we describe the semantic contributions of *tal*.

2.2 Evidentiality and evaluation

In this section, I review the two possible meanings that *tal* contributes *to un tal 'X'*.

2.2.1 Evidentiality

The first meaning is purely evidential, illustrated by the examples in (14) above, repeated as (30) below. In (30)a, *tal* indicates that the speaker only has hearsay knowledge about the person's name, as shown in the translation. By contrast, the sentence loses its evidential meaning in the absent of *tal*, as seen (30)b. In that case, the PN becomes a regular CN that also loses its unique reference (cf. also Härtl & Seeliger's 2017 'name-forming' use of *so-called*).

(30)   a.   Llegó   un tal   Ernestico.
             arrived a   certain Ernestico
             'A person allegedly named Ernestico arrived.'

         b.   Llegó   un Ernestico.
             arrived an Ernestico
             'An Ernestico arrived.'

It is worth noting that the source of evidence for *un tal 'X'* must be hearsay, not inferential. For example, in some families, offspring take their parents' first name followed by *hijo/a 'son/daughter'* or *junior* in some varieties of Spanish, so that *Eduardo hijo* or *Eduardo junior* is Eduardo's son. Thus, one could infer someone's name by knowing the parent's name. However, in that context, (31) cannot be used to mean that the person must be called

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[5] An anonymous reviewer correctly notes that verbs like *llamar* 'call', *bautizar* 'baptize', etc. only take bare PNs. This confirms the idea that the indefinite is not an expletive in any obvious way.

'Eduardo Jr.' because he is Eduardo Sr.'s son. In other words, the meaning of *tal* cannot reflect an inferential source of information.

(31)   #Ese debe ser un tal   Eduardo hijo/junior.
      that must be a   certain Eduardo son/junior
      'That must be a certain Eduardo Jr.'

Researchers have identified several properties of evidentials (cf. Faller 2002; Matthewson, Rullmann & Davis 2007; and in particular Murray 2010, for a summary). For example, Murray (2011) notes that the source of evidence cannot be contradicted. This observation can explain why *un tal 'X'* is not possible in the context illustrated in (32). The fact that the speaker knows *Ana* very well means that she has direct evidence of her name, but *un tal* suggests that the source of evidence is hearsay.

(32)   Context: My best friend Ana walks into the room.
  #¡Llegó   una tal   Ana!
    arrived a   certain Ana
    'A certain Ana arrived!'

Similarly, *un tal 'X'* is incompatible with a quotation, as seen in (33)a. If we assume that a quotation in this context involves first-hand information, then the statement in (33)a would involve contradictory sources of evidence: 'hearsay' contributed by *tal* and 'direct' contributed by the quotation. Bare PNs, on the other hand, have no evidential conflict, as seen in (33)b.

(33)   a. *Un desconocido se me acercó   y   me dijo: 'me llamo un
        a   stranger   CL CL approached and CL told: CL called a
        tal   Pedro'
        certain Pedro

    b. Un desconocido se me acercó   y   me dijo: 'me llamo Pedro'.
        a   stranger   CL CL approached and CL told: CL called Pedro
        'A stranger approached me and said: 'I'm called Pedro''.

Evidentials can be either illocutionary operators or epistemic modals (cf. Murray 2010 for a summary and discussion of tests to distinguish them). Illocutionary evidentials do no commit the speaker to the truth of the content of the proposition, although he is committed to the source of evidence. In the case of *un tal 'X'*, the content would be the PN itself and, as (34)a shows, the speaker is not committed to that content, so the actual name of the person can be contradicted. By contrast, the person's name cannot be contradicted when the PN is bare, as seen (34)b.

(34)   a. Me presentaron a un tal   Luis, pero yo sé   que no se llamaba
        CL introduced to a certain Luis, but I   know that not CL called
        Luis.
        Luis
        'They introduced me to one Luis, but I know that he wasn't called Luis.'

    b. Me presentaron a Luis, #pero yo sé   que no se llamaba Luis.
        CL introduced to Luis, but I   know that not CL called Luis
        'They introduced me to Luis # but I know that he wasn't called Luis.'

A third property of evidentials is that they tend not to interact with negation, as shown for *un tal 'X'* in (35). This example cannot mean 'someone not allegedly called Ernestico bought the business', presumably because negation cannot take immediate scope over the evidential.

(35)   Según   María, no compró el   negocio un tal   Ernestico.
        according Maria, not bought the business a   certain Ernestico
        'According to Maria, a certain Ernestico didn't buy the business.'

Evidential *un tal* shares some of these properties with prenominal epistemic adjectives like *supuesto* 'alleged', which do not modify the extension of the noun's referent. Rather, these adjectives introduce a modal interpretation. In this sense, *supuestos* 'alleged' in (36)a does not commit the speaker to the content of the noun, in fact, this example can be directly denied, as in (36)b. The continuation in (36)b suggests that the speaker is not committed to the content of the proposition, or in this particular case, to whether the perpetrators were promoters or not.

(36)   a.   Los supuestos promotores estafaron a mucha gente.
              the alleged   promoters conned   to many   people
              'The alleged promoters conned many people.'

        b.   … y   de hecho no eran promotores.
                and in fact   not were promoters
              'and in fact, they were not promoters.'

Epistemic adjectives are also incompatible with negation, as seen in (37).

(37)   *Los no supuestos promotores estafaron a mucha gente.
         the not alleged   promoters conned   to many   people

However, whereas *un tal* targets the name of the PN, *supuesto* targets the properties associated with a PN, as seen in (38). In this example, *supuesto* questions whether the person was the manager of *Seguros Monterrey*, not whether his name was Carlos González Hernández. We will return to this difference below.[6]

(38)   From CREA, Real Academia Espanola, acessed on 11/15/2018
        Las cuatro ventas antes mencionadas fueron realizadas por un supuesto Lic.
        Carlos González Hernández, gerente de Supervisión Técnica de Seguros
        Monterrey en la metrópoli, pero la aseguradora indicó a la PGR que esa persona
        no trabaja para ella.
        'The four previously mentioned sales were done by an impostor bachelor Carlos
        González Hernández, manager of Technical Supervision of Seguros Monterrey in
        the capital, but the insurance company indicated to PGR that this person does
        not work for them.'

These diagnostics confirm that evidential *tal* has illocutionary force and that it conveys a 'hearsay' source of information.[7]

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[6] Similar observations apply to *cierto* 'certain', which shares some properties with *un tal*, for example the incompatibility with definite determiners: *un cierto aburrimiento* 'a certain boredom'/*el cierto aburrimiento* 'the certain boredom'. However, *cierto* is not possible with PNs: *un/el cierto Pedro* 'the certain Pedro'.
    Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising questions about *cierto* and to Andrés Saab, p.c. for questions about the parallel between *un tal* and epistemic adjectives.

[7] *Un tal 'X'* does not align with all of the properties of illocutionary evidentials. For example, it is not possible in true informative questions, as seen in (i).

    (i) *¿Cuándo llegó   un tal   Ernestico?
            when   arrived a   certain Ernestico

2.2.2 Evaluation

Aside from evidential meaning, *tal* can have evaluative content, as illustrated by the statement in (39), a 1995 quote from a Basque politician, Javier Arzallus. In this statement, Arzallus was dismissively referring to the new bishop of the city of Bilbao, whose non-Basque-sounding last name suggested that he was not originally from the Basque Country nor a speaker of Basque. *Tal* in this context does not convey source of information about the name, but rather the speaker's negative evaluation of the person as indexed by his name.[8]

(39)   Nos han nombrado a   un tal   Blázquez.
       CL have named   DOM a so-called Blázquez
       'They have imposed on us a "so-called" Blázquez.'

Evaluative *un tal* seems very similar to English *so-called,* analyzed by Härtl & Seeliger (2017) and illustrated in (40).

(40)   The so-called 'beach' was a thin strip of black volcanic grit.

They describe one of *so-called*'s readings as modalizing or distancing, specifically as involving a negative evaluation. They test whether this use can be denied using a propositional negation, or using a contradiction that targets not-at-issue content (*Wait a minute…!*), and they find that participants rated not-at-issue denials higher than propositional negation denials, suggesting that negative evaluation readings convey not-at-issue content.

   Although it is not easy to replicate these data with *el tal 'X',* the patterns illustrated in (41) suggest that it also involves not-at-issue content. *El tal* in (41)a introduces a pejorative evaluation of 'Blázquez', perhaps because he is not welcome as a bishop, as suggested in the earlier example. In that context, attempting to reject the at-issue content through propositional negation is infelicitous, as shown in (41)b, whereas a not-at-issue denial is slightly better, as seen in (41)c.

(41)   a.   Nos nombraron a-l   tal   Blázquez.
            CL introduced DOM-the certain Blazquez
            'They named the "so-called" Blázquez.'

       b. #No es verdad. ¡Blázquez es una maravilla!
          not is true   Blazquez is a   wonder
          'That's not true, Blázquez is charming!'

       c.   ¡Un momento! ¡(Si)   Blázquez es una maravilla!
            one moment   (EMPH) Blazquez a   is   wonder
            'Wait a minute, Blázquez is wonderful!'

The fact that a not-at-issue content is better than propositional negation suggests that the negative evaluation meaning is not-at-issue, although clearly distinguishable from evidential meaning.

2.3 Definiteness

Although it is possible to have definite *el tal 'X',* in that case, two things happen: the meaning tends to be much more clearly evaluative rather than evidential, and several of the distributional/interpretive restrictions above disappear. To begin with, *el tal* 'the so-called' can appear with CNs (cf. (42)), with inanimate nouns (cf. (43)), and with plural nouns (cf. (44)):

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[8] This evidential/evaluative ambiguity has also been observed for *dizque,* a CP-related particle analyzed by Travis (2006) and Demonte & Fernández-Soriano (2014).

(42)   Había un árbitro malísimo. El   tal   Pedro/árbitro…
        was   a   referee terrible. the so-called Pedro/referee…
        'There was a terrible referee. The "so-called" Pedro/referee…'

(43)   Dice que se le apareció un árbol. El   tal   árbol no   lo
        says that CL CL appeared a   tree. The so-called tree   not CL
        encontramos.
        found
        'S/he said that a tree showed up. The "so-called" tree, we couldn't find.'

(44)   Vimos a   unos   Capuletos/adolescentes. Los tales
        saw   DOM INDEF.PL Capuletos/teenagers   the so-called
        Capuletos/adolescentes andaban paseando.
        Capuletos/teenagers   ASP   walking
        'We saw Capuletos/teenagers. Those "so-called" Capuletos/teenagers were walking.'

If the noun is a CN, then prenominal adjectives are more acceptable, as shown in (45).

(45)   Después que   cancelaran el   vuelo, hablamos con   el 'representante de los
        after   that cancelled   the flight talked   with the representative of the
        usuarios' de la   línea aérea. ?El tal   supuesto
        users   of the line aérea. the certain alleged
        representante   no   nos resolvió el   problema.
        costumer.representative not CL solved   the   problem
        'After they cancelled the flight, we talked to the airline's 'costumer
        representative'. The alleged representative did not solve our problem.'

As these examples show, *el tal 'X'* becomes a definite description that refers to an antecedent in discourse, and in this sense it is definite. Consequently, it cannot appear in existential contexts, as seen in (46).

(46)   Llegamos a la   reunion. *Había el   tal   Ernestico.
        arrived   at the meeting was   the so-called Ernestico
        'We arrived at the meeting. There was the "so-called" Ernestico.'

The fact that the changes in the distribution of *el tal 'X'* correlate with a change in the meaning of *tal* suggests that evidentiality is crucial for the PN-like properties of *un tal 'X'*.
   The properties of the alternation between *un/el tal X* are summarized in (47).

(47)   Summary of properties of *un/el tal 'X'*

	PN/CN	SG/PL	Definite interpretation	Animate/ inanimate	Prenominal Adjective	Evidential/evaluative
Un tal 'X'	✓/*	✓/*	Not required	*	*	✓/✓
El tal X	✓/✓	✓/✓	Required	✓	✓[9]	??/✓

To summarize the relevant issues, the properties of *un tal* challenge the generalization in (9), which states that PN determiners tend to be definite if they are not specialized, and also the paradox in (12), which describes two competing views of D_{PN} as either definite or expletive. Evidential *tal* cannot appear with a definite determiner and must appear with the indefinite. Conversely, evaluative *tal* can appear with the definite determiner, and is not restricted to PNs.

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[9] Prenominal adjectives are only possible with CNs.

3 Proposal

As suggested, the main issue that *un tal 'X'* raises is the paradox of a PN with an indefinite determiner that designates a unique individual, and can appear in existential contexts. As suggested earlier, evidentiality plays a key role in creating the special set of circumstances that allow this DP to exist. In this section, I will first spell out the assumptions regarding definiteness, then I will present the account of evidentiality that I will be adopting, and finally, I will put those pieces together to account for why the definite determiner is incompatible with *tal 'X'* when the meaning is evidential. This account will include a proposal that connects evidentiality and person marking as two sides of the same coin, following Speas (2004).

3.1 On definiteness

PNs are generally interpreted as definite and, for this reason, they tend to appear with a definite determiner (cf. (12)a above). Two properties have been identified with definiteness in the literature: familiarity and uniqueness, among others. Heim (1982; 1983) argues that definiteness involves familiarity in the sense of presupposing an existing referent in discourse. Thus, if a speaker wants to refer to an individual named *Ana*, she automatically presupposes that the individual named Ana exits in discourse. The existence presupposition is not cancellable for PNs, unlike with ordinary definite descriptions: whereas *the current king of France* is false because it has no referent, *Ana* automatically presupposes an individual named 'Ana'.

In addition to familiarity, definiteness induces uniqueness and maximality (cf. Chierchia 1998, among others). Specifically, Chierchia (1998: 346) derives uniqueness and maximality by generalizing the iota operator 'ι': when applied to a set of singularities, the operator "will yield a result only when the predicate has just one object in its extension."

Next, we turn the contribution of evidentiality, and later to the interaction between (in) definiteness and evidentiality.

3.2 Evidentiality and naming content

As mentioned above, *un tal 'X'* has two possible meanings, evidential and evaluative. We argue that the evidential meaning, in particular, is possible with PNs because it operates on the naming content of the PN. This means that the NP predicate *Ernestico* has the meaning {ιX such that X is named '/ernestiko/'} and the evidential provides information about the source of this naming, yielding {ιX such that X allegedly named '/ernestiko/'}. This account explains why *un tal* is not compatible with CNs: since a regular CN does not involve being named anything, the evidential cannot target that semantic content.

I adopt a view of illocutionary evidentials as contributing pragmatic and presuppositional content (cf. Potts 2005, among others). Specifically, if we assume that discourse participants share a common ground that contains the set of shared presuppositions, the role of evidentials is to restrict that common ground through not-at-issue content (cf. Murray 2010; 2011). Murray (2010: 94–5) illustrates this point with the Cheyenne direct evidential shown in (48)a. This sentence has the at-issue, propositional content 'Floyd won', similar to the translation in English, and not-at-issue content indicating that the speaker has direct experience about the at-issue content. Whereas at-issue content can be denied and is negotiable by saying 'no, he didn't win', not-at-issue content is non-negotiable and cannot be denied, so that the continuation 'you didn't witness it' is not felicitous. A similar account would apply to the hearsay evidential illustrated in (48)b.

(48)   *Cheyenne*
     a.   É-hó'tȧhéva-∅   Floyd.
         3-win-DIR   Floyd
         'Floyd won, I'm sure.'
     b.   É-hó'tȧhéva-sėstse   Floyd.
         3-win-RPT   Floyd
         'Floyd won, I hear.'

Not-at-issue content is asserted and directly added to the common ground. For example, when a speaker uses the reportative evidential in (48)b, the initial common ground is the one represented in the left figure in (49). This common ground includes whatever presuppositions and implicatures the discourse participants initially share. Once the statement in (48)b is produced, reportative evidential *–sėstse* 'I hear', represented as RPT, automatically updates the common ground to those situations in which the speaker heard the content 'Floyd won'. This update is represented as the intersection portion of the center figure in (49). If the listener accepts the propositional content 'Floyd won', then the common ground is further updated, as indicated by the darkest intersection in the right-most diagram in (49). This new common ground is restricted to the situations in which Floyd won, and the speaker heard that information.

(49)   Contribution of evidentials to the common ground

However, if the speaker does not accept the propositional content, for example, if she replies: 'No, she didn't win', then the common ground will not be updated with at-issue content. Thus, common ground updates can be automatic (as in the case of non-negotiable, not-at-issue evidential updates) or negotiable (as in the case of at-issue content updates).

  The extension of this proposal to the case of *un tal 'X'* would be as follows: imagine the discourse in (50). The initial discourse context at the time of the embedded temporal clause in bold, is represented in the left-hand diagram in (51), and it includes the common ground updated by 'we were sitting at a restaurant'.

(50)   Estábamos sentados en la   mesa de-l   restaurante **cuando llegó   una**
         were   sitting   in the table of.the restaurant when   arrived a
         tal   María.
         certain Maria
         'We were sitting at the table in a restaurant when one María arrived.'

(51)   Contribution of evidential *un tal* to the common ground

Un tal automatically updates the common ground to the situations where the speaker heard that 'someone is called 'María'', as shown in the middle diagram of (51) (recall that RPT indicates reported information). Finally, the proposed at-issue update would be that 'someone (who is called María) arrived', as in the right-hand diagram of (51). As before, the interlocutor can deny this last proposed update, for example by saying: *no, era Marta* 'no, it was Marta', or *no, no llegó* 'no, she didn't arrive', but the reported source of María's name cannot be questioned.

To sum up, first, *tal* represents an evidential operator, second, it takes structural scope over the naming predicate introduced by the PN; third, the evidential content is not-at-issue and it automatically updates and restricts the common ground. Because it is not-at-issue, the source of evidence cannot be contradicted.

3.3 Definiteness and evidentiality

We are now in a position to derive the incompatibility between the definite determiner and evidential *tal*. In the preceding sections, I assumed that PNs must be unique and familiar, which results in using the definite determiner in the default case (more on this below). I also proposed that evidential *tal* contributes not-at-issue content that automatically updates the common ground. In this section, I will suggest that evidential content is incompatible with the familiarity presupposition.

Recall the generalizations established in section 2.3: whenever the determiner is definite, the meaning of *tal 'X'* is evaluative, not evidential, as shown again in (52).

(52)   Llegó   el   tal   Ernestico.
        arrived the   so-called Ernestico
        'The "so-called" Ernestico arrived (only evaluative, not evidential).'

Let us see how the common ground would be updated in those cases. Since the definite determiner indicates that the NP is familiar, this means that the proposed common ground update will only include contexts in which the referent of the PN is familiar. However, in those contexts in which the speaker is familiar with the referent of the DP, she should also have evidence as to the person's name. In other words, the initial common ground already includes *Ernestico*, and therefore, his established name. When the speaker uses *tal* as an evidential, the common ground is automatically updated only to those situations in which the speaker heard that X is called *Ernestico,* as represented in (53). However, this newly updated common ground does not share anything in common with the familiarity presupposition encoded in the PN, so the final common ground cannot be successfully updated.

(53)

RPT restriction of C_{INIT}

To put it slightly differently, because the evidential, not-at-issue content involves an automatic update, it prevails over the familiarity presupposition. The only available alternative in this case is to eliminate the familiarity presupposition, namely to use an indefinite determiner. Conversely, the definite determiner becomes possible when *tal* is interpreted as an evaluative, rather than as an evidential (cf. (52)). In this case, the evaluative is not evidential, although I have suggested that it is also not-at-issue. To account for the difference between evidentiality and evaluation, I offer two tentative possibilities: first, the evaluative not-at-issue content does not automatically update the common ground (and is therefore subject to negotiation, unlike evidential content), or, alternatively, if the evaluative common ground update is automatic, that evaluative content does not conflict with familiarity. I leave this issue open for further research.[10]

3.4 On PN licensing: Generalizing the person hierarchy

One immediate consequence of the analysis just presented is that definiteness/familiarity cannot be the only property licensing PNs. Rather, definiteness/familiarity is the default value, given the normal conditions in which a PN appears. These conditions can be systematically altered, as we saw with evidentiality. The familiarity presupposition is cancelled due to the presence of evidential content, therefore the definite determiner does not appear. However, this conclusion raises the question of why PNs should yield a familiar presupposition in the general case. As mentioned in section 1.2, Bernstein (2008) and Longobardi (2008) propose that DPs are licensed by a [person] feature in D, based on the complementary distribution of pronouns and determiners in certain contexts in Italian (cf. (13) above, repeated as (54)).

(54) a. I   ricchi stanno trascurando certi   problema.
          the rich   are.3PL neglecting   certain problems
          'The rich are neglecting certain problems.'

      b. Noi ricchi stiamo   trascurando certi   problema.
          we rich   are.1PL neglecting   certain problems
          'We the rich are neglecting certain problems.'

      c. *I   ricchi noi stiamo trascurando certi   problema.
          the rich   we are.1PL neglecting   certain problems

---

[10] Andrés Saab (p.c.) suggests that the evaluative meaning is derived from the evidential one. This is an important topic, since these two meanings are closely related, and they also appear in the reportative/evaluative particle *dizque* 'supposedly'. I have no clear ideas about the directionality of the relationship between the two, however.

However, this paradigm does not extend to Spanish, which lacks a pronominal determiner in similar cases, as discussed in Jelinek (1984); Ordóñez & Treviño (1999) and Camacho (2013), see (55).

(55)   a.   *Nosotros ricos estamos ignorando ciertos problemas.
            we   rich are.3PL neglecting certain problems

       b.   Nosotros los ricos estamos ignorando ciertos problemas.
            we   the rich are.3PL neglecting certain problems
            '(We) the rich are neglecting certain problems.'

This contrast between Spanish and Italian suggests that the syntactic location of [person] may vary across languages (D in Italian, a higher head in Spanish). Be that as it may, it is also true that pronominal determiners are generally restricted to plural contexts (cf. (56) a), and for this reason, they are not productive with PNs (cf. (56)b–d). This suggests that [person] is not the only possible way of licensing D.

(56)   a.   *Ella la candidata está   haciendo campaña.
            she the candidate is.3SG doing   campaign

       b.   *Ella Rosa está   haciendo campaña.
            she Rosa is.3SG doing   campaign

       c.   *Yo José no sé   nada   de física.
            I   Jose not know.1SG anything of Physics

       d.   *Tú Marta entiende-s   el   problema.
            you Marta understand-2SG the problema

In order to see other possibilities, we turn to Speas' (2004) account of evidentiality in connection to Harley & Ritter's (2002) feature hierarchy for referential expressions. Speas (2004) proposes that evidentials are governed by constraints similar to those that govern referential expressions. Specifically, she extends the feature hierarchy for referential expressions developed by Harley & Ritter (2002) to a modal base. This extension yields an evidential feature hierarchy, as illustrated in (57).

(57)   Discourse-participant configurational representation (Harely & Ritter 2002; Speas 2004)

a.   Referring expression (= Pronoun)   b.   Modal base

          Participant   individuation   Deictic sphere   Individuated

   Speaker   Addressee   + Speaker   – Speaker

When the feature hierarchy applies to a referential base, the result is the hierarchy of referential expressions we see in (57)a, when it applies to a modal base, we obtain the evidential feature hierarchy in (57)b. As Speas (2004: 261) argues, "evidential morphemes spell out an agreement relation between the discourse and the world(s) in which the sentence is to be interpreted". For example, a direct-evidence evidential will encode a modal base restricted to the [+SPEAKER] node in (57)b. Hearsay evidence, on the other hand, involves a modal base restricted to [INDIVIDUATED].

This proposal offers a principled connection between evidentiality and referentiality (cf. also Rooryck 2001) that will allow us to account for important parts of the distribution of *un tal 'X'*. We can now reformulate Longobardi and Bernstein's insights about the importance of person in licensing DPs, as in (58).

(58)   A DP in Italian/Spanish involves a feature from either the referential or the modal feature hierarchy.

Let us assume that these features are hosted by a syntactic head 'IND', which will take a value from one of the nodes represented in the hierarchies in (57). For example, the DP *el gato* 'the cat' involves the value [INDIVID] for IND in the referential base in (57)a, whereas *noi ricchi* 'we rich' involves the value [PARTICIPANT] for that same node in that same base. In the case of *un tal 'X'*, I propose that IND takes the value [INDIVID] from the modal base, as represented in the structure in (59). As in Longobardi's (1994) analysis, the PN raises, but only to IND. This accounts for why no prenominal adjectives are possible. When IND is not spelled out as *tal*, as in *Ana,* the PN can raise further to D. The overt result is a bare PN. The partial spellout rules for D are presented in (60).[11]

(59)

```
              DP
            ⟋   ⟍
          D     INDP
              ⟋     ⟍
          IND         NP
           |           |
          tal      Ernestico_PN
       [INDIVID]
```

(60)   a. $D \rightarrow \emptyset_D / [_D\ D\ +\ IND_{[REFBASE]}]$ (corresponding to N-to-D raising)
        b. $D \rightarrow el,\ la,$ etc. $/\_IND_{[REFBASE]}$ (no raising)
        c. $D \rightarrow un,\ una,$ etc. $/\_\ IND_{[MODBASE]}$

Familiarity, in turn, is a feature that can optionally be associated with 3rd person, individuated DPs, as seen in (61). In the first example, *un peatón* is indefinite (specific or non-specific). In the second one, it is definite/familiar.[12]

(61)   a.   Había un peatón   cruzando.
              was   a   pedestrian crossing
              'There was a pedestrian crossing.'

        b.   El   peatón   llevaba una camisa azul.
              the pedestrian wore   a   shirt   blue
              'The pedestrian wore a blue shirt.'

As I have argued earlier, PNs must be [INDIVID] and familiar, although the familiarity presupposition can be cancelled when [INDIVID] applies to a modal base.

   An anonymous reviewer wonders whether the proposed analysis extends to other cases beyond *un tal 'X'*. It is true that most DPs in Spanish, Italian or English are licensed via the referential base, not the modal one. However, some possibilities worth exploring involve

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[11] An anonymous reviewer notes that *señor* 'mister' would follow the pattern of prenominal adjectives: *el tal señor Vázquez* 'the alleged Mr. Vazquez'. This is consistent with the fact that *señor* follows determiners in the regular case: *el señor Vázquez*. See Bernstein, Ordóñez & Roca (2016), who propose an intermediate category for ClassifierP for items such as honorific *don/doña* and the PN determiner *en/na* in Catalan. The distributions observed by them somewhat overlap the ones described in this paper, although they diverge in important ways as well.

[12] DPs with a referential [PARTICIPANT] feature, which includes [SPEAKER] and [ADDRESSEE] seem to be obligatorily familiar, as seen in (i). In this example, although the adverb induces a generic reading, the 1st person can only refer to a familiar speaker.

(i)   Siempre que salgo,   llama   alguien.
       always   that go.out.1SG calls.3SG someone
       'Whenever I go out, someone calls.'

epistemic adjectives, such as *supuesto* 'alleged', illustrated in (62), already discussed in section 2.2.1.

(62)   Un supuesto representante de la   compañía llamó por teléfono.
        an alleged   representative of the company called by   phone
        'An alleged representative of the company phoned.'

As suggested in that section, epistemic adjectives share some modal properties with *un tal*, but *un tal* has a source of evidence content that is not present in *supuesto*. This difference could be accounted for by proposing that *supuesto* applies to the root of the modal base in (57)b, whereas *tal* applies to the [IND] node. Following this idea, *supuesto* 'alleged' updates the common ground to those situations that are identical to the current one, but where the person who called is an impostor.

   In other languages, evidentiality is more systematically expressed in nominals (cf. Imai 2003; Lecarme 2008). For example, according to Dixon (1972), nouns in Dyirbal appear with a noun marker with which they agree in case. This marker also indicates noun class and distance from the speaker, as illustrated in (63).

(63)   *Dyirbal* (Dixon 1972: 46)
        a.   bayi   yaɾa miyandaŋu.
             there.VIS man is.laughing
             'That man is laughing.'
        b.   giyi   yaɾa miyandaŋu.
             here.VIS man is.laughing
             'This man is laughing.'
        c.   ŋayi   yaɾa miyandaŋu.
             there.NOT.VIS man is.laughing
             'The man (not visible) is laughing.'

More importantly for our purposes, *bayi* 'there.VIS' and *giyi* 'here.VIS' indicate a visible referent, whereas *ŋayi* 'there.NOT.VIS' indicates a non-visible referent. Reference to visibility is also pervasive in other Austronesian languages like the Western Desert language (Wati) and in the Western Torres Strait language (Dixon 1972: 45). Thus, in terms of the hierarchy in (57), all three noun markers in Dyirbal would indicate distance with respect to the [+SPEAKER] node in the referential scale. Additionally, since they also indicate evidential content, they would also have values specified for the modal base: *bayi* 'there.VIS' and *giyi* 'here.VIS' indicate source of information, namely content related to the [+SPEAKER] node in the modal base, and *ŋayi* 'there.NOT.VIS' indicates source of information related to the [INDIVIDUATION] node in the modal base.

   Danziger (1994) describes a similar pattern in the locative system of Mopan Mayan, which also involves divisions structured around participants and evidentiality (visible and non-visible): *waye'* 'deictic locative' centered on the speaker, *ta'kan* 'deictic locative' centered on the interlocutor, *tilo'* 'deictic locative' centered on a visible third person, and *te'* 'deictic locative' measured around an non-visible third person'.

   These paradigms from Dyirbal and Mopan Mayan provide further evidence of the interaction between the referential and the modal hierarchies in (57). They further illustrate the possibility that both bases simultaneously apply within the same nominal structure.

   To summarize, I have proposed that PNs include a syntactic head IND whose semantic value [INDIVID] yields two possible results: when applied to the referential base, the PN is a person-licensed non-speaker, non-addressee, when it applies to the modal base, it is hearsay headed by *tal*. In the former case, the determiner is ∅ if N raises to D, or *el/la* if

it does not. In the latter case, no raising is possible, and the determiner is *un/una* because hearsay is incompatible with the familiarity presupposition. I have also shown other cases in which the current analysis may be extended: epistemic adjectives like *supuesto* 'alleged', noun markers in Dyirbal and deictics in Mopan Mayan. Finally, these examples raise the possibility that both modal bases apply to the same nominal structure.

4 Conclusions

The main question raised in this paper is whether definiteness is a defining property of PNs. I have argued that *un tal 'X'* in Spanish suggests that definiteness is only the default case that results from the familiarity presupposition on PNs. However, when the conditions are right, not only is definiteness not necessary, it is not possible. Specifically, the evidential content contributed by *tal* is incompatible with the familiarity presupposition, which is cancelled. As a result, the definite determiner is not possible, and the indefinite determiner takes its place. Based on this correlation between evidentiality and indefiniteness, I have suggested that licensing a PN involves a feature from a hierarchy that can apply to the referential domain, yielding the traditional person licensing, or to the modal domain, yielding indirect evidence.

Abbreviations

CL = clitic, DIR = direct evidential, DOM = differential object marking, EMPH = emphatic, FEM = feminine, GEN = genitive, LOC.VOICE = locative voice, MAS = masculine, NOT. VIS = not visible, PAST = past, PL = plural, PN = proper name, POSS = possessive, RPT = reported evidential, SG = singular, SPEC = specific article, VIS = visible

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Competing Intererests

The author has no competing interests to declare.

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